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Abstract
Agricultural economic literature shows the difficulties to manage insurance
contracts that include systemic risk. The aim of the paper is to present an
approach to overcome such difficulties. It is applied to a crop yield insurance
contract but can be extended to other insurance contracts such as revenue or
crop margin. On the one hand, the recommended strategy realizes the pooling
of farms risks, the technique usually used to manage insurance contracts. On
the other hand, this strategy realizes the transfer of the poolling risk to financial
markets, the technique used to manage farms systemic risks component. The
financial market model includes a crop yield futures contract, a price futures
contract, and a zero-coupon bond. It is shown in the theoretical approach that
this strategy allows for an intermediation for a risk-free management of such a
type of insurance contract.
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A Private Management Strategy for the Crop Yield
Insurer:
A Theoretical Approach & Tests
In recent research in agricultural economics, crop yield insurance and revenue
insurance are a major topic of discussion. Four main research areas are interesting
to recall. First of all, the farm risk management using insurance contracts is dealt
with in literature, see for example Coble et al. (2000) for modelisation or Sherrick
et al. (2004) for an empirical analysis of farmer’s demand. Secondly, it proposes
several models to estimate the contracts premiums (Stokes, 2000; Just et al., 1999).
Thirdly, it proposes a definition of optimal insurance contracts (Mahul and Wright,
2003). Finally, some authors such as Skees and Barnett (1999) deal with the role and
implication of government. But today we can observe that crop yield insurances in the
United States of America or in the European Union do not exist without government
reinsurance and/or subsidies. Our paper aims at dealing with the ability for an insurer
to design and manage a crop yield insurance contract without public reinsurance.
Agricultural risks are multidimensional. They include price, yield, quality and
production cost hazards. Moreover, they include a high systemic risk component
because of the high correlation among farm-level risks. Consequently, individual risks
are not independent and the law of large numbers does not apply. Whatever the
contract design or the premium, the annual Loss Ratio of insurer will be extremely
variable around the balance. Therefore, if an insurer pools a portfolio of several crop
insurance contracts, it will bear the systemic risk component. It does not usually
have enough equity to face up to this risk (Smith et al., 1994).
Miranda and Glauber (1997) argue that the systemic risk component is the major
obstacle that prevents an independent private crop insurance industry from emerging.
We agree with this statement, and this paper aims at overcoming the difficulty.
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The first idea is to have multi-year management to get the balance of the Loss
Ratio over several years. The law of large numbers over several years applies in
this reasoning. It implicitly assumes that the risk is independent from one year to
another and that there is neither a change in the climate nor an evolution of the
technical and economic environment. In this context, some authors determine a
contract that maximizes the profit utility of the insurer (Nelson and Loehman, 1987;
Ker and Goodwin, 2000). Others even argue such as Skees and Barnett (1999) that
crop yields are not insurable, which results in the need for public action.
Private reinsurance is the second idea to cope with this difficulty. Even at this
level, the pooling of production regions cannot be really achieved because the regions
are heterogeneous. The weather and technical and economic hazards can be very
different from one region to another irrespective of the size of the region (Turvey
et al., 1999; Mason et al., 2003).
A third idea is the transfer of the systemic component to financial markets, as
suggested by Miranda and Glauber (1997): “Clearly, neither insurance markets nor
options markets alone are capable of providing adequate individual crop loss risk pro-
tection in the absence of government support. However, insurance and option [or
futures] markets together, each performing within its inherent limitations and exer-
cising its own particular strengths, could provide a market solution to the crop risk
insurability problem.”
Considering the literature review of Tomek and Peterson (2001), the scientific
community deals abundantly with the use of futures and options by optimal hedg-
ing. In particular, Vukina et al. (1996) indicate that double hedging with price and
yield futures reduces farm risk better than just hedging with price futures markets.1
But, in addition, their work assess that, even in ideal conditions, double hedging is
not able to eliminate the risk generated by the covariance between price and yield.
Opposed to this discrete time strategy, Guinvarc’h et al. (2004) propose continuous
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management strategy able to eliminate this “covariance” risk component. It is based
on the replicating portfolio of the revenue futures contract and uses both the crop
yield futures contract and the price futures contract. This strategy is applied by an
intermediary that offers a revenue futures or option contract.
Mason et al. (2003) propose to manage insurer (or reinsurer) risk with an optimal
double hedging as proposed by Vukina et al. (1996). They test this proposition in
the case of the Risk Management Agency’s reinsurance. It results that RMA’s risk is
indisputably reduced but the risk taken remains too high for a private insurer.
We choose to enhance the risk management problem of the crop yield insurer by
a continuous management strategy. While others have argued that it is impossible
for a insurer to offer insurance contracts that can deal with the multidimensional
farm risks without government support, we theoretically show that an insurer can
privately manage a crop yield contract that includes both systemic and idiosyncratic
risk components. The first section presents the theoretical approach of the model and
the second realizes the tests.
The theoretical approach
Our approach to crop yield insurer management is described in figure 1. The insurer
sells an insurance contract to the farmer, conserves the idiosyncratic risk component
and uses financial markets to transfer the multidimensional systemic risk component.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The first subsection defines the model and its assumptions. The second subsection
proposes an estimation of the crop yield insurance premium. Using this estimation, a
replicating portfolio is built in the third subsection allowing a self-financed strategy
to manage the insurance contract.
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The model and its assumptions
In order to develop the crop yield insurance contract, we first describe the farmer’s
financial loss brought about by the crop yield and then the contract indemnity. Next,
the model of financial markets is presented. It includes three contracts: the price
futures, the crop yield futures and the zero-coupon bond. We define the time de-
composition of the risk management of the crop yield insurance contract. At last, we
define the assumptions on the conditional density of losses.
The insurance contract
In the case of a crop yield insurance contract, the farmer’s indemnity (or compensa-
tion) depends on the potential financial loss suffered because of a low crop yield. We
assume that the insurer insures n farms for this contract. The farmer j has a crop
yield loss if his crop yield yj is smaller than a minimum y
j
m. The quantity y
j
m is the
smaller crop yield suitable for the farmer. The financial value of this loss `j is equal
to `j = pj × max(yjm − yj, 0) where pj is the farm random unit price of the product
at the end of the production period (T +). Therefore, the concept of crop yield loss
includes both price hazard and crop yield hazard.
The mathematical indemnity function I(`j) defines the insurance contract. The
principle of indemnity2 requires that 0 ≤ I(`j) ≤ `j and that the function I increases
in `. Moreover, the model is designed for an indemnity proportional to the farm’s
loss. Then, I(`j) = λ`j where λ is a constant value in [0, 1]. In the model, the policy
holders are uniformly distributed throughout the area linked to the crop yield futures.
It is assumed there is no moral hazard.
Let us also specify two differences between a crop yield option and a crop yield
insurance contract: first of all, a crop yield option is unidimensional when crop yield
insurance is bi-dimensional (it does not depend on the random price). Secondly, a crop
yield option does not depend on the individual crop yield but on the area crop yield.
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The current Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) indemnities are also different from
the crop yield insurance contract definition because they do not include the random
dimension of the price.
The financial contracts motions assumptions
We note Bt a zero-coupon bond with the continuous risk-free rate r. We note t
the time between 0 (the beginning of the quotation of both futures) and T (the
settlement time). W Ft and W
Y
t stand for two one-dimensional standard Brownian
motions defined on filtered probability space (Ω,F , P). F is the price futures contract
and Y is the crop yield futures contract. At maturity, the price of the crop yield
contract is proportional to the area crop yield. We assume that F and Y are geometric
Brownian motions.3 The parameters of F are µF and σF and the parameters of Y
are µY and σY . Let us present the model of the financial market:
Ft = F0 +
∫ t
0
σF FudW
F
u +
∫ t
0
µFFudu (1)
Yt = Y0 +
∫ t
0
σY YudW
Y
u +
∫ t
0
µY Yudu (2)
Bt = exp(−r(T − t)) (3)
where µF , µY , σF > 0 and σY > 0 are known constants. The price motion of F and
Y are not independent so we note δ = cov(W Fu , W
Y
u ). We assume that the covariance
δ between both Brownian motions is negative because generally the price increases
when production decreases.
We define Wt a two-dimensional Brownian motion by:
Wt =

 W Ft
1√
1−δ2 (W
Y
t − δW Ft )


By applying Girsanov’s theorem to Wt with the risk neutral probability,
4 noted
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P
∗, we get W ∗t (Musiela and Rutkowski, 1997, section 10.2):
W∗t = Wt −
∫ t
0

 σF 0
−δσF√
1−δ2
σY√
1−δ2



 r − µF
r − µY

 du (4)
It results that, under P∗:
d

 Ft
Yt

 =

 σF Ft 0
0 σY YT



 1 0
δ
√
1− δ2

 .dW ∗ + r

 Ft
YT

 dt (5)
The time decomposition
The risk management can be split into two periods. We introduce the time T + ε,
that stays after T for a very little period ε. The first period begins at 0 and ends at
T and the second period begins at T and ends at T + ε.
We note T + the “right-limit” of T + ε when ε → 0. At time T , we assume that
the individual results (pj, yj) are not known. They are only known at T
+ and as a
result, the individual loss `j can be calculated.
In terms of model building, we use a retrospective reasoning (from T + to T and
from T to 0). In terms of insurer strategy management, it is naturally the reverse.
Then, in the second management step, we build an instantaneous insurance contract
that begins at T and finishes at T +. Its premium Prj(FT , YT ) is the conditional
expected value at T of the indemnity j knowing (FT , YT ). Then, the premium of the
instantaneous insurance contract depends on FT and YT . It is a common insurance
contract managed in a very short time (ε). Next, in the first management step, we
build a financial contract X j bought at t = 0 whose price at T accurately tallies with
the premium of the instantaneous insurance contract Prj(FT , YT ). It is a derivative
contract defined by its underlying assets (the crop yield futures, the price futures)
and its price at maturity (Prj(FT , YT ) at T ).
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[Figure 2 about here.]
At t = 0, the farmer is subscribing an insurance contract that, if needed, gives
an indemnity at T + that depends on this loss. It is the view of the insured farmer.
The insurer sells the farmer the financial contract Xj (at t = 0) whose value allows
the financing of the instantaneous insurance contract premium at T (figure 2) that,
if necessary, provide an indemnity with the farmer at T +.
The conditional density of losses
The moment T is the hinge between the two management operations. At this time,
the insurer needs an estimation of the instantaneous insurance contract premium.
Therefore, we introduce the conditional density f jFT ,YT of `j which depends on FT and
YT . For the second part of model, we need that f
j
FT ,YT
was known and was twice
differentiable in the two variables.
We deduce the conditional density of loss from two assumptions. The first one
concerns the relation between yj and YT . We choose the most classical modelisation
used for example by Just et al. (1999), by Mahul and Wright (2003) and by Smith
et al. (1994):
yj = αj + βjYT + γjζ (6)
where αj, βj and γj are parameters of farm j and where ζ is a random variable
with E[ζ] = 0. By model building, the random values ζ and YT are independent.
Moreover, we assume that ζ is a standard normal random variable. This model was
analyzed recently by Ramaswami and Roe (2004). They showed in particular that
higher aggregation reduces the systemic risk component and increases the idiosyn-
cratic component.
On the one hand, the crop yield is always positive and on the other hand loss is
defined only if crop yield is less than yjm. Therefore, the loss is found if 0 < yj < y
j
m.
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We deduce that loss exist if ζ verifies:
κj =
−αj − βjYT
γj
< ζ <
yjm − αj − βjYT
γj
= ηj
The second assumption concerns the farm price at time T +. We assume that the
farm crop price pj is the future price FT . It results that `j = FT × max(yjm − yj).
Therefore, the indemnity does not take account of the farm price basis risk in this
model.
From Equation 6 and the ` definition, we conclude that the conditional density
of losses f jFT ,YT is a normal density with mean FT (y
j
m − αj − βjYT ) and standard
deviation FT γj.
Estimation of the insurance contract premium
First, we calculate the premium Prj(FT , YT ) of the instantaneous insurance contract
at time T . This conditional value allows us to define the settlement price of the
derivative. Second, we calculate the derivative price at 0 and deduce the crop yield
insurance contract premium.
The price of the instantaneous insurance contract
The price of the instantaneous insurance contract is defined by:
Prj(FT , YT ) = ET [I(`j)|FT , YT ]
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Using the conditional density function, the expected indemnity may be calculated as
follows:
Prj(FT , YT ) =
∫ +∞
0
f jFT ,YT (`j)I(`j)d`j
=
∫ ηj
κj
Fλ(yjm − αj − βjY − γjζ)f(ζ)dζ
= Fλ(yjm − αj − βjY )
∫ ηj
κj
f(ζ)dζ
+Fλγj
∫ ηj
κj
−ζf(ζ)dζ
where f is the standard normal density function. We observe that f ′(ζ) = −ζf(ζ)
and obtain the estimated premium of the instantaneous insurance contract:
Prj(FT , YT ) = Fλ(y
j
m − αj − βjY ) (N(ηj)−N(κj)) + Fλγj (f(ηj)− f(κj)) (7)
where N is the normal standard cumulative function.
The price of the derivative contract
The price of the derivative contract X j is equal to Prj(FT , YT ) at T . We know that
X∗T = e
−rTPrj(FT , YT ) is a square-integrable random variable under the martingale
measure P∗. Therefore, from the martingale representation property, we conclude that
there exists one and only one predictable process θ such that the stochastic integral
X∗t = EP∗[X
∗
T ] +
∫ t
0
θudW
∗
u (8)
follows a (square-integrable) continuous martingale under P∗. We deduce that the
value Xt of the derivative at t is equal to e
rt
EP∗[X
∗|Ft]. This value must be estimated
using numerical procedures because an explicit formula is not available.
The premium of the crop yield insurance contract at subscription time t0 is equal
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to the value pit0(X) of the derivative. Moreover, we note that the premium depends on
the price of futures contracts. The premium can differ from one year to another. For
earlier subscriptions, markets have less information, so anticipations are just based
on historical grounds. Therefore, if the subscription is early (at time 0), the premium
should be stable from year to year.
Now, we know the price of the crop yield insurance contract and the next subsec-
tion presents the insurance contract management strategy.
The insurance contract management strategy
As presented in figure 2, the insurer breaks down the crop yield insurance contract
management into two steps. This subsection presents both the pooling step and the
financial step.
Pooling of the instantaneous insurance contract step: from T to T +
At T , the insurer receives the premium Prj(FT , YT ) to pool farmers’ risks at T
+. FT
and YT are known. Then, for the n insured farms, we get:
E
[
aj
n∑
j=1
I(`j)
∣∣∣∣∣ FT , YT
]
=
n∑
j=1
ajE[I(`j)|FT , YT ] =
n∑
j=1
ajPr
j(FT , YT )
where (aj)0≤i≤n represent the respective planted surface of the n insured farms. If
assumptions are verified, the error pooling is:
n∑
j=1
ajγjζj
For all YT , we note that
∑n
j=1 yj converges to YT in probability when n is increasing
because the n policy holders are uniformly distributed throughout the area. Because
of the independence between YT and (ζj)0≤j≤n, it results that error pooling
5 converges
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in probability to 0.
Financial step: from 0 to T
The quotation of Xj on the market does not look feasible first because this derivative
contract is more complex than an European option. Second, the derivative is specific
to the insurer, limiting its potential liquidity. Even if the designed derivative is not
quoted, we are able to compute its price under the model assumptions at any time.
Thus, the insurer has to manage the derivative directly on the two futures Ft and Yt
(delta hedging). Then, in order to describe the management strategy from 0 to T , its
replicating portfolio should be built.
A portfolio is described by the line matrix (φF , φY , φB) where φF is the number
of price futures contracts, φY is the number of crop yield futures contracts and φB is
the number of unit bonds.
Proposition 1 The self-financing replicating portfolio φ of X j is given by:
φu =
(
∂Xu
∂Fu
,
∂Xu
∂Yu
, Xu − ∂Xu
∂Fu
Fu − ∂Xu
∂Yu
Yu
)
(9)
Proof.
On the one hand, Equation 8 gives:
dX∗u = θudW
∗
u = hu.

 dF ∗
dY ∗

 = hu.

 dF
dY

− rhu.

 Fu
Yu

 du (10)
where we have put
hu = exp−r(T − u)θu

 1 0
−δ√
1−δ2
1√
1−δ2



 1/σF F ∗u 0
0 1/σY Y
∗
u


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Knowing that dX∗u = dXu − rXdt, it results that φB = Xu − hu.

 Fu
Yu

. On the
other hand, we applied Itoˆ’s formula to X:
dXu =
∂Xu
∂u
du +
∂Xu
∂Fu
dFu +
∂Xu
∂Yu
dYu +
1
2
∂Xu
∂F 2u
(σF F
∗
u )
2du
+
∂Xu
∂FuYu
< (σF F
∗
u , 0), (δσY Yu,
√
1− δ2σY Yu) > du + 1
2
∂Xu
∂Y 2u
(σY Y
∗
u )
2du
Using identification between the last equation and equation 10, we deduce that hu =
(∂Xu
∂Fu
, ∂Xu
∂Yu
), and then that φF =
∂Xu
∂Fu
and φF =
∂Xu
∂Yu
. It can easily be checked that
dφu = dXu because X
∗ is a martingale under the measure P∗. The portfolio φ is then
self-financing.
Using this self-financing strategy, the insurer can manage the derivative contract
Xj. If assumptions are acceptable, the financial strategy error depends on the fre-
quency where futures positions of the replicating portfolio are adjusted.
Tests
This subsection aims at illustrating the theoretical results with tests of the strategy
management. Tests are realized for each step of the insurance management strategy.
The first subsection presents the test of the premium of the instantaneous insurance
contract and the second presents the test of the derivative strategy management.
Test of the premium of the instantaneous insurance contract
This subsection aims at testing the second strategy step and is split into three parts.
The first one describes the used data and the second one proposes the tests. The
third and last subsection comments the theoretical results and the tests.
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The crop yield data of Illinois State
The used county yield historical data of Illinois State during 1972–2002 are public
data of the National Agricultural Statistics Service.6 The Illinois State includes 102
counties. For each year, we know the area crop yield and the cumulative planted acre
of each county. The used price data provides from University of Illinois Endowment
Farm Division, and are detrend using US tresory historical rates data.
The yield data were adjusted for trends to reflect the 2002 production levels.
The trend rate, obtained with an exponential regression of Illinois State annual yield
during 1973–2002, is 1.22% per year. The crop average yield of Illinois producers is
144.95 bushels per acre with an annual coefficient of variation of 13.95% (a minimum
of 86.48 and a maximum of 171.68). Data include extreme events as the low yield
crop of the years 1983 and 1988.
The range correlation between the county crop yield noted Yit and the State crop
yield during 1973–2002 is [0.51, 0.94] with a mean of 0.84. Therefore, the county crop
yield risk includes systemic and idiosyncratic risk components.
Of course, the perfect conditions to test the first step of the insurer management
strategy need a set of farm crop yield data. However, the county yield data let us
carry out a significant test of the management strategy because the county crop yield
risk includes, as farm risk, systemic and idiosyncratic components.
Pooling tests description
Because we used county yield data, the tested contract is similar to the Group Risk
Plan and the Group Risk Income Plan. The loss of the county i is `i = FT×max(yim−
Yit) and the indemnity is defined by I(`i) = `i because λ is chosen equal to 1. The
county parameters αi, βi and γi of Equation 6 are estimated using the ten previous
years’ values. According to our assumptions (normal distribution of ζ), we use least
square regression for estimation. The minimum yield Yim of the county depends on
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these historical results and a unique value Ym using the relation:
Yim = αi + βiYm (11)
Therefore, the premium of the instantaneous contract g(FT , YT , i) can be computed
for each county for each year. According to our assumptions, the insured area ratio
is uniform throughout the State. Because of the high variability of the instantaneous
contract premium, the usual loss ratio (Indemnities/Premiums) is unadapted. There-
fore, we test if the error ξ of the instantaneous contract management is near to 0 each
year, where:
ξ = Indemnities−Premiums =
102∑
i=1
ai F ×max(Yim− yi, 0)−
102∑
i=1
ai g(F, Y, i) (12)
where ai is the planted corn area ratio of the county i. Because we need the ten
previous years values to define the parameters, all results concern the period 1982–
2002.
Instantaneous insurance contract management tests results
Let us specify that the indemnity standard deviation are 37.57, 28.89 and 21.33
($/acre) where Ym are equal respectively to 135, 125 and 115 (bu/acre). Knowing
that average indemnities per acre are respectively $19.28, $13.06 and $8.73, it results
that the indemnity coefficients of variation are respectively 195%, 221% and 244%.
As presented by Miranda and Glauber (1997), the percentage of variability observed
for conventional insurance lines is very lower (e.g. Auto collision: 6%, Workers com-
pensation: 9%, Crop hail: 15%).7 Moreover, it is interesting to relate this value to
the concept of solvency margin. The legal safety minimum of the solvency margin
is around 15% to 20% of premium in most of European Countries. Then, we clearly
deduce that traditional private insurance is not able to support this high variability.
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However, the standard deviation of error ξ of the instantaneous contract is signif-
icantly smaller than the indemnity variability. They are respectively 3.34, 3.48 and
3.43 ($/acre), then they represent 17%, 27% and 39% of the average indemnities. This
results are still higher than variability coefficients of conventional insurance lines but
this values are now close. Moreover, let us precise that double static hedging of Mason
et al. (2003), mentioned in introduction, reduces the standard deviation around by
half. The derivative X i are really more effective.
The errors are illustrated in figure 3 when Ym = 125 (the error is null if the point
is on the bisecting line). Errors are really small if we consider that on the one hand
we only used basic assumptions and, on the other, the tested period includes extreme
events.8
[Figure 3 about here.]
Test of the derivative strategy management
We use for the test of the first step, the corn yield futures quotation data during
1997-1998. This subsection aims at testing the financial management step of the crop
yield contract. First, it describes the Chicago Board of Trade quotations data used.
It then proposes the tests and, finally, presents and comments the tests results.
The CBOT quotation data
The data of the Chicago Board of Trade used are quotations of the corn price futures
and the Illinois crop yield futures during 1995–2000. For the crop yield futures, we
only take into account the settlement of January 1997 and January 1998 because
more liquidity has be founded (respectively 42 and 140 contracts exchanged). The
corresponding corn price futures are respectively December 1996 and December 1997.
Moreover, the risk-free rate of 1996 used is 5,20% and that of 1997 is 5,14% (From
Econstat, US Treasury Instrument).
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The financial management tests description
The test uses exactly the theoretical strategies presented in the previous section.
Futures positions are adjusted each quotation day (at closing price). To get close
to real conditions, the geometric Brownian motions parameters of futures contracts
are estimated on the previous year quotation using the classical method presented by
Hull (2000). The covariance between the two Brownian motions is estimated by the
instantaneous correlation between Ft and Yt. For the 19 December 1996 settlement
test, we used the following parameters: µF = 0, 07, σF = 0, 268, µY = −0, 06,
σY = 0, 0556, ρ = −76, 68% and r = 5, 07%. For the 19 December 1997 settlement
test, we used: µF = −0, 082, σF = 0, 244, µY = −0, 019, σY = 0, 0580, ρ = −93, 15%
and r = 5, 02%.
We choose to test the derivative contract management in the case of the Cham-
paign county of Illinois. These parameters of the crop yield hazard are estimated in
the previous subsection. In 1996, the estimation gives αi = −22.67, βi = 1.22 and
γi = 14.39, and in 1997 αi = −23.71, βi = 1.23 and γi = 14.39.
As in the instantaneous contract management test, we examine three different
contracts. λ = 100% for each contract and Ym are respectively 135, 125 and 115
bu/acre. Using Champaign parameters, we deduce that Yim are respectively 141.88,
129.69 and 117.50 bu/acre in 1996 and respectively 142.28, 129.98 and 119.69 bu/acre
in 1997.
Moreover, an explicit formula of the derivative price is not available. Then, the
price Xt must be estimated:
Xt = e
rt
EP∗[X
∗]
= e−r(T−t)EP∗
[
FT λ
(
(yjm − αj − βjYT ) (N(ηj)−N(κj)) + γj (f(ηj)− f(κj))
)]
Let us introduce a control variate E(FT , YT ) = FT × max(Yim − αi − βiYT , 0) or
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βiFT × max(Ym − YT , 0). First, we note that Prj(FT , YT ) ≥ E(FT , YT ) and that
Prj(FT , YT ) ≈ E(FT , YT ) for extreme values of YT . Secondly, we recognize that
E is the difference between two geometric Brownian motions and then E could be
assimilated with an exchange option. More precisely, E(FT , YT ) is equal in law to
max(S1T − S2T ) when S1 and S2 are two geometric Brownian motions with: S1T =
βiFT Ym, S
2
T = βiFT YT , σ1 = σF , σ2 =
√
σ2F + σ
2
Y + 2δσF σY and the correlation
coefficient:
δS =
σ2F + δσF σY
σ1σ2
As proved by Guinvarc’h et al. (2004) in the same framework, it results under P∗ that
S1t = βiFtYm and that S
2
t = βi × exp((r + δσF σY )(T − t)) × FtYt. Thirdly, the price
of this exchange option is known by the Margrabe (1978) formula. Also, we deduce
that E is a suitable control variate to estimate Prj(FT , YT ). Then, we would like to
estimate the value of the replicating portfolio φu. We note that:
∂Xu
∂Fu
=
∂Xu
∂X∗u
∂X∗u
∂F ∗u
∂F ∗u
∂Fu
= eru
∂X∗u
∂F ∗u
e−ru =
∂X∗u
∂F ∗u
Moreover, ∂
∂F ∗u
X∗T exist and is continuous. Then:
∂Xu
∂Fu
=
∂
∂F ∗u
EP∗[X
∗
T ] = EP∗[
∂
∂F ∗u
X∗T ]
Using the definition of Prj(FT , YT ), we deduce that
∂XT
∂Fu
= XT
Fu
. Moreover, knowing
that ∂
∂Yu
Prj(FT , YT ) = −FT λβi (N(ηi)−N(κi)), we also obtain that:
∂Xu
∂Yu
= −EP∗ [e−r(T−t) × FT λβi(N(ηi)−N(κi))]
Therefore, we are able to estimate the portfolio φu used in the risk management
strategy of the crop yield insurance contract.
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Financial management tests results and comments
Table 1 presents the tests results. In spite of the low liquidity of the crop yield
futures, we obtain a low error for the management strategy. The financial management
strategy stated in the theoretical section is then performed to manage a portfolio of
crop yield insurance contract.
[Table 1 about here.]
This strategy is illustrated in figure 4 with the Champaign parameters when Ym
is chosen at 135. The value of Xt reaches a minimum of $2.71 and a maximum of
$38.71. Then, the figure shows that management strategy is suitable to manage the
large variations of Xt.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The beginning value of derivative (X0) is $21.48 and this settlement value is $32.56.
The result of the financial management strategy gives $34.07. Therefore, the set-
tlement error is equal to $-1.51. In respect of the volatility of the derivative price,
errors are acceptable. Both the instantaneous insurance premium tests and the finan-
cial tests prove the practical ability for an insurer to manage a crop yield insurance
contract.
Conclusion
Can a private insurer manage an agricultural crop insurance contract that includes
a large systemic risk component without public reinsurance? As a conclusion to this
paper, it is theoretically feasible and practically manageable under the existence of
adequate futures contracts (mainly, the crop yield futures contract). This manage-
ment strategy questions therefore the relationship between private insurance activities
and public intervention.
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A strong implication of the above model is the need for insurance companies to
have access to financial markets. Today, the worlds of finance and insurance are
tightly linked so they are technically able to unite their expertise. However, there is
a legal issue as regulations in many countries usually limit the capacity of actors to
combine their expertise.
The strategy proposed in this paper opens commercial prospects for insurers. Fur-
thermore, it could open opportunities for financial markets to include new contracts.
If this model offers interesting prospects, it has some limits. The main limit of this
work is market completeness. Our model assumes the existence of the price futures
contract and the crop yield futures contract. The Chicago Board of Trade quoted
crop yield contracts from 1995 to 2000. The contract was removed due to market
imbalance and therefore a lack of liquidity. The Exchange has been working on many
contract improvements in order to reopen this market for different agricultural crops.
The model of a crop insurance contract, as developed in this paper, could bring an
additional and important liquidity to this incoming market.
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Notes
1Two years later, Li and Vukina (1998) measured the effectiveness of this hedging
for North Carolina producers.
2According to this principle, the insured cannot profit from a loss.
3Abundant literature deals with a more adapted financial model that includes
stochastic volatility and/or jump processes. Particularly, our assumption implies log-
normality for crop yields while they tend to be negatively skewed. Nevertheless, this
assumption is the standard of continuous time financial models proposed by Black
and Scholes (1973) and it may enable us to prove the interest of our insurance risk
management approach.
4
P
∗ is the unique measure equivalent to P where

 F ∗t
Y ∗t

 is a local martingale
under P∗.
5As shown by Ramaswami and Roe (2004), (ζj)j=1,...,n are not independent. Then,
we cannot apply the central limit theorem to prove the convergence in probability of
the error pooling.
6www.usda.gov/nass/
7US statistics during 1963–1992.
8In 1988 for example, indemnities reached 36% of the possible maximum indemnity
estimated at $350 per acre (
∑102
i=1 ai F × Yim).
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Figure 3: The instantaneous contract estimated premium relative to the observed
value when Ym = 125 (1982–2002).
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Figure 4: Illustration of the financial management strategy test when Ym =
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Dec 1996 Dec 1997
Ym 135 125 115 135 125 115
Beginning Price 13.04 3.83 0.73 21.48 7.91 1.99
Settlement Price 12.13 3.03 0.45 32.56 12.97 3.38
Strategy Results 13.69 3.56 0.44 34.07 13.59 3.44
Error -1.56 -0.53 0.01 -1.51 -0.62 -0.06
Min Xt 11.58 2.91 0.44 2.71 0.46 0.05
Max Xt 52.58 22.71 6.78 38.71 16.62 4.87
Table 1: Financial management strategy tests results.
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